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1. Introduction 
‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less’. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
This Chapter is a scene-setter for the remainder of the Report. We begin by considering how 
pension schemes have traditionally been used and also how they are likely to be used in 
future following the introduction of the pension reforms announced in the 2014 Budget.  
These reforms furnish us with an opportunity to ask anew what a ‘good’ pension scheme 
should aim to achieve. There are also risks involved in the provision of pensions and we 
discuss the key ones. Unfortunately, widespread evidence shows that many if not most 
pension scheme members do not understand these risks and are unlikely ever to do so, 
however much guidance or education they receive. This will make it difficult for many of 
them to make informed choices about how they spend their retirement savings that takes 
these risks into account. This, in turn, raises the question about whether scheme members 
should be nudged (or even defaulted) into a well-designed decumulation product that has 
dealt with these risks in the most efficient and cost-effective ways possible – with the option 
to opt out, as in the case of auto-enrolment. We then consider the different types of 
pension member affected by the reforms. Finally, we discuss the attitudes of employers, 
consultants, providers, investment managers, and trade unions to the reforms.  
1.1 Pension schemes – uses and risks 
1.1.1 Uses 
The primary purpose of a pension scheme is to provide life-long retirement income security 
for however long the scheme member lives.2  This Report will examine retirement income in 
private-sector pension schemes, principally workplace schemes set up by employers for 
their employees. There are currently two types of such schemes in the UK – defined benefit 
(DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes. DB schemes – which aim to deliver a pre-
defined pension in retirement, typically linked to average or final salary, together with the 
option of a tax-free cash lump sum – are in decline in the UK private sector and are being 
replaced by DC schemes – which specify what goes into the scheme in terms of 
contributions, but not what comes out in terms of the size of the pension. The Report will 
therefore concentrate on DC schemes, the type of scheme most people will have in the 
                                                     
2 This definition of a pension scheme as providing insurance against outliving one’s resources  is well 
established in the academic literature, see, e.g., Zvi Bodie (1990) Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 28, 28-49; and Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond (2008) Reforming Pensions: 
Principles and Policy Choices, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford. 
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future, although it will also look at transfers from DB to DC schemes. The Government’s 
‘freedom and choice’ agenda introduced in the Budget on 19 March 2014 is intended to 
apply to both DC and funded DB schemes, but not to unfunded DB schemes which most 
public-sector workers have.3  
Table 1.1 Criteria for a good DC pension scheme 
 Delivers adequate and sustainable pensions;4  by sustainable, we mean having 
support mechanisms in place that help people not to spend their pension fund too 
quickly after retirement 
 Produces stable and predictable lifelong retirement incomes, even if those incomes 
cannot be guaranteed (unless a lifetime annuity is purchased) 
 Offers the flexibility to purchase a lifetime annuity at any time (or at regular 
predetermined intervals) 
 Has the flexibility for members to withdraw funds to meet ‘lumpy’ expenses, such as 
the cost of a new boiler 
 Provides an investment strategy that reflects the scheme member’s attitude to and 
capacity to take risk, and generates a return at least as high as inflation 
 Provides value for money for every pound saved in the scheme 
 Has transparent charges and costs 
 Provides reliable and efficient administration 
 Delivers effective communications to members 
 Protects scheme assets from fraud or theft 
 Has minimum quality standards in terms of operational efficiency, charges and 
governance with a duty by the governance committee to act in members’ best 
interests 
 If individuals are constructing their own pension scheme, they should use products 
that are effective and easy to understand5 
 
In order to make any assessment about the retirement income from a DC pension scheme, 
we need to establish a benchmark for comparison. In other words, we need to establish 
what ‘good’ outcomes would be in a DC scheme. On the basis of our analysis and feedback 
                                                     
3
 H M Treasury (2014) Freedom and Choice in Pensions, Cm 8835 (Session 2013-14), 19 March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/294795/freedom_and_choic
e_in_pensions_web_210314.pdf. 
4 
European Commission (2003), Adequate and Sustainable Pensions, Publication Office, Luxembourg. 
5
 In a similar way as was imposed on default funds in the accumulation phase. See Department for Work and 
Pensions (2014) Better Workplace Pensions: Further Measures For Savers, Cm 8840, March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/298436/better-workplace-
pensions-march-2014.pdf 
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from our various discussions, we believe that a good DC pension scheme will meet the 
criteria set out in Table 1.1.6,7,8  
The 2014 Budget added two new possible uses for a pension scheme. The first of these is 
inheritability – the residual pension fund on the death of the scheme member can be 
inherited by a nominated beneficiary.9 Further, the 2014 Taxation of Pensions Act abolished 
the so-called ‘death tax’, the 55% tax charge on pension death benefits if the member dies 
before 75, so that the nominated beneficiary can inherit the residual pension fund without 
paying any tax. If the member dies after 75, the nominated beneficiary pays tax on the 
residual pension fund at their marginal tax rate. Given the generally low level of pension 
savings in DC schemes in this country, this outcome is likely to only be of real benefit to a 
relatively small number of well-off pensioners.10 But the consequences will be much more 
widespread. The inheritability of the pension fund became possible because the Chancellor 
removed the requirement to annuitise the assets in the pension scheme.11 At a stroke, the 
Chancellor converted all pension schemes in the UK – including DB schemes – into savings 
schemes, with no essential difference between them and other savings schemes, such as 
independent savings accounts (ISAs). However, the Chancellor cannot change the definition 
of a pension scheme which is to pay a pension until the member dies. Nevertheless, a key 
implication of his decision is that the risks involved in retirement income provision – in 
particular longevity risk – have been almost entirely individualised. The benefits from any 
form of collective risk sharing have been removed. 
                                                     
6 
The criteria listed in Table 1.1 will need quantifying for the table to be operationally useful.  
7
 The Pensions Regulator has identified the following 6 elements necessary to achieve the good member 
outcome of an adequate income in retirement in DC schemes: 
 Appropriate contribution decisions  
 Appropriate investment decisions  
 Efficient and effective administration  
 Protection of assets  
 Value for money  
 Appropriate decumulation decisions. 
See The Pensions Regulator (2011) Enabling Good Member Outcomes In Work-Based Pension Provision, 
Discussion Paper, January; http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/dc-discussion-paper-2011.pdf 
8
 Note that following ‘freedom and choice’, it might well be the case that a ‘good’ pension scheme is no longer 
provided by a single organisation: there might be one organisation providing the accumulation stage and 
another providing the decumulation stage. Table 1.1 would have to be modified to reflect this. 
9
 David Cameron MP, the Prime Minister, said: ‘we want to make sure we complete this great revolution 
where we’re giving people much more power to save, to access their pension and pass their pension on to 
their children’ (reported in Steven Swinford and Dan Hyde (2015) Crackdown on banks that deny loans to the 
elderly, Daily Telegraph, 18 April).  
10
 Very few people will have amassed a significant sum in their pension pot by age 55. 
11
 The Chancellor, George Osborne MP, announced in the Budget: ‘Pensioners will have complete freedom to 
draw down as much or as little of their pension pot as they want, any time they want. No caps. No drawdown 
limit. Let me be clear. No one will have to buy an annuity … People who have worked hard and saved hard all 
their lives, and done the right thing, should be trusted with their own finances’. 
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The second new potential use is debt clearance. Previously, pensions could not be assigned 
to pay off a loan. After April 2015, everyone over 55 can take their pension as a lump sum. 
Strong supporters of the new pension regime are banks and building societies with 
customers with interest-only mortgages who earmarked no specific savings arrangements to 
pay back the mortgage loan.  If these customers have pension schemes, the mortgage 
lender can now invite them to exercise their pension ‘freedom’ and pay off the mortgage.12  
1.1.2 Risks 
It is important to be aware of the risks involved in the generation of retirement income from 
pension savings. The key risks are listed in Table 1.2. Following ‘freedom and choice’, these 
risks are now borne directly by DC scheme members. 
Table 1.2 – Key risks involved in the generation of retirement income from pension savings 
Contribution risk The risk that pension contributions (and 
hence pension savings) are lower than 
planned, e.g., because the scheme member 
becomes unemployed, is unable to work due 
to ill health, or is unable to pay off their 
debts 
Retirement timing risk Uncertainty about when the scheme 
member will retire and/or begin to make 
withdrawals 
Product choice risk  Uncertainty about how the scheme member 
will make withdrawals, not least because of 
the very large set of choices now available  
Investment risk  The risk that investment performance is 
worse than expected or the risk that 
investments do not generate incomes in a 
way that matches the desired pattern of 
consumption in retirement. A particularly 
important example of investment risk is 
sequence-of-returns risk 
Inflation risk  The risk that inflation is higher than 
anticipated 
Interest rate risk  The risk that interest rates are low at the 
point of annuity purchase 
                                                     
12
 But at the risk of ending up with an inadequate retirement income and the potential cost to tax payers of 
additional welfare benefits. 
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Longevity risk  The risk that the individual savers live longer 
than their life expectancy (i.e., idiosyncratic 
longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a 
whole live longer than anticipated (i.e., 
systematic or aggregate longevity risk) 
Cost risk  The risk that the total costs of running the 
pension scheme during accumulation and 
decumulation are higher than expected or 
understood 
Political risk  The risk that the Government changes the 
rules in an adverse way (e.g., reduces the 
level of tax relief) 
Regulatory risk  The risk that regulations change in an 
adverse way (e.g., the regulator increases 
regulatory capital requirements, which has 
the effect of reducing annuity rates) 
Demographic/cultural risk  The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are 
unable to honour the implicit 
intergenerational contract that underlies 
many pension schemes. For example, the 
next generation of workers refuses – or is 
unable – to pay the pensions the retired 
generation expects to receive, because they 
are unwilling to honour the implicit contract 
or because there are too few of them in 
relation to the size of the retired population. 
Also, an arrangement that works in one 
culture (e.g., Holland) might not work in 
another (e.g., the UK) 
Market conduct risk  The risk that those who provide services to 
the scheme act in a way that disadvantages 
scheme members (e.g., investment 
managers subject to a charge cap negate the 
effects of the charge cap by increasing 
portfolio turnover, or the benefits of 
economies of scale go to scheme providers’ 
shareholders rather than to members); fraud 
and the activities of scammers would be 
included here 
Behavioural risk  The risk that scheme members behave in a 
way that is not considered to be rational 
(i.e., is not in their long term interests, since 
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they make short-term decisions that they 
subsequently regret and are unable to learn 
from past mistakes). Inertia and lack of 
engagement would be included here, as 
would be the risk that members fail to 
understand the risks they face 
Financial knowledge and understanding risk The risk that a member’s financial 
knowledge and understanding are 
insufficient for the member ever to make an 
‘informed choice’ 
Mental impairment risk  The risk that a scheme member’s mental 
faculties are reduced due to the onset of 
dementia, for example 
 
There are a number of ways of dealing with such risks in general: 
 The risks can be assumed or ‘run’ – this might be deliberate (e.g., in the case where a 
scheme member increases the level of investment risk in their pension fund in the 
hope of achieving a higher investment return and, hence, a higher anticipated 
pension13) or unavoidable (e.g., in the case of contribution, political or regulatory 
risk) 
 The risks can be regulated against – effective regulation can reduce cost and market 
conduct risk, for example 
 The risks can be explained – by informing people well in advance the importance of 
giving providers reliable signals of when and how the pension pot will be accessed, 
or explaining behavioural biases and nudging people towards making optimal 
decisions 
                                                     
13
 An early example of investment risk following the introduction of the pension reforms was the Chinese stock 
market crash in August 2015 (dubbed the Great Fall of China), which elicited the following headlines in the 
Daily Mail (above to an article by Louise Eccles published on 25 August): 
Don't risk cashing in your pension: Retirees warned they could cause 'irreparable damage' 
if they withdraw lump sums from their pots at such a volatile time  
 The top 100 companies in the UK – in which many pensions are invested – have 
had £170billion wiped off their value in the past two weeks 
 FTSE 100 down by almost 10% triggered by Chinese stock market crash 
 Fall means pensions invested in market have also plunged by up to 10% 
 Britons warned to hold fire on big decisions until markets have stabilised 
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 The risks can be reduced – by careful design of the scheme. For example, by careful 
design of the investment strategy and by making the most of diversification, 
investment risk can be reduced 
 The risks can be pooled amongst members of a given cohort (known as intra-
generational risk pooling) – idiosyncratic longevity risk can be pooled and hence 
made more stable and predictable, but this, in turn, requires scale (i.e., only large 
pension schemes can do this) 
 The risks can be shared between members of different cohorts (known as inter-
generational risk sharing) – investment returns can be smoothed across different 
cohorts using a smoothing fund 
 The risks can be hedged if there are suitable hedging instruments – e.g., inflation and 
interest rate risk can be hedged using inflation and interest rate derivatives, but 
systematic longevity risk cannot currently be hedged due to the absence of longevity 
bonds and indexed longevity swaps 
 The risks can be managed within a carefully designed default plan into which the 
members are auto-enrolled. When someone first starts work, this will be a default 
accumulation plan with a default contribution rate and investment strategy. When 
someone retires, this could be a default retirement expenditure plan. The onset of a 
mental impairment, such as dementia, needs to be identified early and carefully 
managed 
 Finally and most worryingly, the risks can be ignored. 
Unfortunately, many people do not understand the risks in Table 1.2, especially longevity 
risk, although they are unavoidable aspects of building up pension savings over a 40-year (or 
longer) working life and then running down those savings over a retirement period that 
could last 30 years or more. Even with improved financial education,14 it is unlikely that 
many people will fully understand some of these risks. This is because some risks have to be 
experienced before they can be genuinely understood, and often it is too late by that stage 
to do anything about them. In addition, many people will have problems understanding the 
full range of product choices that are now available. All this makes it difficult for many 
people to be in a position to make ‘informed’ choices. The Government is offering only 45 
minutes of guidance under the ‘guidance guarantee’ to cover all these issues.15  
If a large group of people cannot understand the risks they face in their pension scheme, 
despite being provided with information about those risks, then they should not be 
                                                     
14
 The Government has encouraged improvements in financial education for years now, athough there is little 
evidence that this has been effective. See, e.g., H M Treasury (2008) Thoresen Review of Generic Financial 
Advice: Final Report, March; 
 webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8/3/thoresenreview_final.pdf 
15
 Provided by Pension Wise – see Chapter 3. 
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expected to manage these risks themselves.16 Instead, if people can have confidence that 
those designing and regulating pension schemes have dealt with these risks in the most 
efficient and cost-effective ways possible, then it might be possible to nudge (or even 
default) savers into making the right choice at retirement for them and their family. To do 
this, we will need to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment and, in particular, the issue of 
having a well-designed default decumulation process at retirement.   
One of the principal lessons of finance theory is that some risks can be reduced through 
diversification, that is, by pooling or sharing risks. Diversification has been called ‘the only 
free lunch in finance’. As mentioned above, two key risks that can be reduced in this way are 
investment and longevity risk. This is one of the key benefits of saving for a pension in a 
large pension scheme. By individualising the risks listed in Table 1.2, the 2014 Budget 
encourages pension scheme members to give up their free lunch. The inevitable 
consequence will be that workers with similar salary histories and pension contributions will 
end up with very different pension outcomes: while some outcomes will be very good, 
others will undoubtedly be very poor. Many people would regard this as undesirable. We 
will examine how diversification benefits can be recaptured either in large schemes like 
NEST (National Employment Savings Trust) or with new types of collective pension schemes. 
1.2 Pension scheme members 
1.2.1 Who will be affected by the pension reforms? 
One of the principal arguments of economic theory is that competition and market forces 
can deliver good outcomes for consumers. However, the Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) 
Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study17 in 2013 provided evidence that 
competition and market forces are not working effectively when it comes to pensions and 
that the market for buyers is ‘one of the weakest that the OFT has analysed in recent years’. 
This is because ‘most employees do not engage with or understand their pensions. Pensions 
are complicated products, the benefits of which occur, for many people, a long time in the 
future’.  
A wide class of pension scheme members will be affected by the new ‘freedom and choice’ 
regime:  
 Members of workplace DC auto-enrolment schemes: active, deferred and pensioners 
 Private-sector defined benefit (DB) scheme members who transfer to a DC scheme. 
Those who take advantage of the DB-to-DC transfer rules might use the DC scheme 
                                                     
16
 One of the reasons why pension schemes were first set up was because people did not understand and did 
not manage well these risks. 
17
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101164215/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-
studies/oft1505 
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offered by their employer, if this includes a drawdown facility. Otherwise, they will 
have to switch to another provider 
 The self-employed 
 Workers with employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment. 
We will examine the characteristics and challenges presented by each group in relation to 
achieving good retirement outcomes. Our main emphasis will be on the first group, 
although we will consider how DB-to-DC transferees, the self-employed and those with 
employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment can also be helped. 
1.2.2 The impact of the pension reforms on welfare benefits 
If things do go badly for members of some of these groups and they run out of money 
before they die or invest unwisely and end up in poverty in old age, this will be a tragedy for 
them individually. But it will not be costless for the rest of society. This is because such 
people can claim certain means-tested welfare benefits which are funded by local and 
national taxation. The main local benefit is council tax support (previously council tax 
benefit, but now localised). 
In March 2015, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) issued a factsheet18 showing 
the qualification rules for the following income-related means-tested welfare benefits that 
will apply in respect of the new flexibilities for accessing pension pots after 6 April 2015:  
 Employment and Support Allowance (income-related)  
 Housing Benefit  
 Income Support  
 Jobseeker’s Allowance (income-based)  
 Pension Credit  
 Universal Credit.  
The rules are extremely complicated. For those below the qualifying age for a state pension, 
withdrawals from a pension pot will be treated as either income or capital, depending on 
certain factors, such as how regular the withdrawals are. If no money has been taken from 
the pot, it will not be taken into account when calculating benefit. For those over the 
qualifying age who choose not to buy an annuity, the DWP will assume they have 'notional 
income' equivalent to that of an annuity, based on 100% of GAD rates.19 Notional income 
must be reviewed: after every drawdown of capital; after every drawdown of income which 
                                                     
18
 Pension Flexibilities and DWP Benefits; 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417473/pension-
flexibilities-dwp-benefits.pdf. 
19
These are the maximum withdrawal rates periodically set by the Government Actuary’s Department for 
capped drawdown (which caps the level of income that can be withdrawn to reduce the risk the fund will run 
out – see Chapter 2); https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drawdown-pension-tables. 
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exceeds the notional income level; and at the claimant's request. If people take an income 
from their pension pot, it will be treated as the actual income if it amounts to more than the 
notional income.  
People who take a cash lump sum will have this treated as a capital withdrawal. Ad hoc 
withdrawals will be regarded as capital (despite potentially being entirely taxed as income). 
If the claimant has savings or investments of an amount greater than the ‘capital disregard' 
(currently £10,000), the excess will be deemed to provide an assumed weekly income, 
currently £1 for every £500 (or part) of the excess.  
Pension income may affect entitlement to contributory benefits. For Employment and 
Support Allowance (contribution-based), all pension income over £85 per week, and, for 
Jobseekers Allowance (contribution-based), all pension income over £50 per week will be 
taken into account. Uncrystallised benefits20 will not impact upon contributory benefits. 
Individuals are warned to avoid ‘deliberate deprivation’. The factsheet explains the 
‘deprivation rule’ which states that if an eligible individual spends, transfers or gives away 
any money taken from their pension pot, the DWP will consider whether they had 
deliberately deprived themselves of that money in order to secure (or increase) entitlement 
to benefits. If it is decided that the individual has deliberately deprived themselves, they will 
be treated as still having that money and it will be taken into account as income or capital 
when any benefit entitlement is worked out. 
However, the factsheet does not make clear how the DWP will decide whether someone 
has deliberately deprived themselves. Commentators have questioned whether people who 
have made poor investment decisions or been a victim of pension fraudsters would be 
caught out by this. For example, Neil Lovatt, director at Scottish Friendly, said: ‘The 
Government is promoting the right of the individual to have control of their pension, while 
reserving the right to decide whether they have used that money wisely. [If a pensioner 
spends their pot on a Lamborghini, the DWP is likely to take a dim view of this], but if a 
pensioner loses money after investing in a buy-to-let property, will that be considered 
reckless? [The rules need to be much clearer about this], otherwise we [will] have 
bureaucrats making judgments on pensioners with the benefit of hindsight’.21 
Entitlement to means-tested benefits is also likely to be influenced by the introduction of 
the new single-tier state pension for future pensioners on 6 April 2016.22,23 This is to be set 
                                                     
20
 These relate to that part of the pension pot which has not been accessed in any way – see Chapter 2. 
21
 Quoted in Harvey Jones (2015) Pension reform may lead to poverty: State will not support spenders with 
benefits, Daily Express, 1 April.   
22
 The following is based on a note from Djuna Thurley, House of Commons Library, 27 March 2015 (1503-243). 
The new single-tier state pension will replace the basic state pension, the state earnings-related pension 
(SERPS) and the state pension (S2P). 
23
 Pensions Act 2014, s1. 
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at £155.65, just above the level of the basic means-tested guarantee (i.e., £155.60 per week 
in 2016-17).24 Thirty-five qualifying years will be needed to be entitled to the full amount. 
People with fewer qualifying years will be entitled to a proportionate amount, provided they 
have at least ten qualifying years.25 The new state pension is expected to reduce eligibility 
for Pension Credit, with the main driver for this being the abolition of Savings Credit.  
Pensioners with relatively low incomes may qualify for means-tested support through the 
Pension Credit. This currently has two elements: 
 The Guarantee Credit tops up weekly income to a ‘standard minimum guarantee’ 
(£151.20 for a single person in 2015-16). Additional amounts are payable in respect 
of severe disability, certain caring responsibilities and housing costs.  
 The Savings Credit aims to provide an additional amount for those aged 65 or over 
who have made some provision for their retirement. The maximum Savings Credit 
for a single person is £14.82 in 2015-16. However, Savings Credit is to be abolished 
for future pensioners from 6 April 2016.26 
Pensioners with housing assets could also be affected by the Care Act 2014. This introduced 
new measures for both financing and limiting the costs of long-term residential or nursing 
care which affects around 150,000 people per year.27 First, it established a mandatory local-
authority-run ‘universal deferred payment scheme’ from April 2015, which means that 
people might not need to sell their home in their lifetime to pay for their care costs. Instead, 
if a local resident meets the eligibility criteria, the local authority pays certain care costs and 
a debt is established against the local resident’s main home. This is a loan against the value 
of the property which is repaid on the local resident’s death. The Department of Health 
states that most people can use ‘around 80% to 90% of the equity available in their home. 
The limit on equity is to protect you from not having enough money to pay sales costs of the 
property - like solicitors' fees - and to protect the council against a drop in housing prices 
and the risk that it may not get all of the money back’. Councils can charge interest linked to 
the cost of government borrowing, up a current maximum of 2.65% p.a.  
Second, the Act establishes a £72,000 cap on care costs. The original plan was to introduce 
the cap in April 2016, but, in July 2015, the Government announced that this would be 
delayed until 2020. The cap will be means-tested. Those with assets of less than 
                                                     
24
 The Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, claims the single-tier pension will be adequate to live on (reported 
in Michael Klimes  (2014)  David Cameron claims single-tier pension is adequate safety net, Professional 
Pensions, 20 October). 
25
 Pensions Act 2014, s2. In July 2015, the DWP announced that only 37% (222,000 out of 600,000) of 
pensioners will be able to claim the full amount in 2016. This is expected to rise to 50% by 2020 and to 84% by 
2035. 
26
Pensions Act 2014, s23 and Sch 12 Part 3. 
27
 http://www.local.gov.uk/care-support-reform/-/journal_content/56/10180/6522542/ARTICLE 
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£17,500 receive free care. There is then a sliding scale of state support up to a threshold of 
£123,000.  Those with assets (including pension assets) above £123,000 will receive no help 
towards the cap. In addition, the cap covers only the cost of personal care (help with 
washing, dressing, eating and mobility) and medical care (requiring nursing supervision), but 
not ‘hotel costs’ such as food and accommodation. Each council will use a ‘resource 
allocation system’ (RAS) to determine the notional cost of care in its area, with costs capped 
at £230 a week. One council, for example, might determine the cost is £200 a week and, if 
total care costs are £700 a week, then the resident is responsible for paying the remaining 
£500 per week. What all this means is that a cap of £72,000 on personal spending on care is 
likely to be a severe underestimate of the true cost of long-term care. According to 
Partnership, a care cost funding provider, the true cost could be double the £72,000 cap.  
When the means test is applied, different sources of income and capital are assessed in 
different ways. In the case of pension or annuity income, 50% of this is disregarded if the 
claimant has a partner. In the case of flexi-drawdown,28 the entire drawdown fund will be 
treated as a capital asset, with an income tariff, equivalent to a single life, non-escalating 
annuity, applied to it. This could mean that the care resident needs to make a greater 
personal contribution in the case of drawdown than in the case of an annuity.  
1.2.3 Pension adequacy and pension inheritance 
We note that one of the good outcomes of a DC pension scheme was an ‘adequate’ 
pension. But this will largely depend on the level of contributions made to the scheme and 
the investment returns on these prior to retirement. It is generally not possible – due to the 
risks involved – to achieve this objective from low levels of pension savings that rely on 
unrealistically high real rates of investment return being realised over extended periods. 
Since our Report is about retirement income, we will be looking at good outcomes, 
conditional on the contributions made during the accumulation phase. We have not been 
asked to address the question of the adequacy of pensions or the adequacy of pension 
savings.  
Nevertheless, we note that, as a society, we are collectively not saving enough for our 
pensions.29 Amongst ‘baby boomers’ in the 55 to 74 age range, 40% have not yet begun to 
save for a pension, according to a recent Blackrock Investor Pulse survey.30 Of those with 
savings, 63% hold them in cash which has lost 15% of its purchasing power over the last 5 
years due to inflation. At the other end of the age range, saving is also a very low priority for 
‘millennials’ – those born after 1980 – according to recent research by BNY Mellon.31 Yet for 
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 Natasha Browne (2015), Research - 40% of baby boomers not saving for retirement, Professional Pensions, 
27 January. 
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living standards to grow, we need to invest in increasing the economy’s capital stock and the 
only sustainable source of long-term investment is long-term savings.32, 33  
Aegon has reported research which shows that people have difficulty in calculating how 
much they need to save for retirement, since they are not clear what they will get from the 
state pension scheme in future. A man aged 65 would need approximately a £200,000 
pension pot to buy a £150-a-week income (roughly the same as the new single-tier state 
pension from April 2016). Duncan Jarrett, of Aegon UK, said: ‘This is significantly more than 
the £63,815 those approaching retirement have on average in their private pension, 
highlighting just how fundamental the state pension is to people’s retirement plans’.34 In 
2014, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation published research which suggests that the 
minimum income needed in retirement is £13,500.35 Since the new single-tier state pension 
is approximately £8,000 p.a., then someone needs a minimum of £5,500 in annuity income. 
At age 65, this costs £103,000 for a level annuity and £145,000 for an index-linked annuity. If 
someone delays the annuity purchase until age 75, the costs are £76,000 and £102,000, 
respectively.36 Even these minimum amounts are well in excess of what most people 
currently have in their DC pot.  
A couple of surveys were published in April 2015 on attitudes to inheritance of the pension 
fund after the member’s death. The first was a survey sponsored by Zurich of 1,000 people 
aged over 50 with DC pensions. Although 79% valued the reforms, 55% said they would 
have no effect on how they spend or save in retirement, while 35% reported that they did 
not expect to leave much of the pension fund to pass on to their family. Only 5% said they 
would change their behaviour, knowing their beneficiaries would inherit more of the 
pension following the removal of the 55% ‘death tax’.37  The second was a survey sponsored 
by HSBC, and contained in a report called Choices for Later Life which found  that 26% of UK 
respondents said retirees should spend all their money, while just 5% thought they should 
save as much as possible for their inheritors. The ‘spend versus save gap’ of 21 percentage 
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points was higher than for any of the other 15 countries involved in the survey; the overall 
average was 8 percentage points.38 Despite these findings, there has been a significant 
increase in the demand for advice about pensions and inheritance tax planning since the 
Budget announcements, according to a survey of accountants by Investec Wealth & 
Investment.39 
1.3 Employers and consultants 
We held a number of meetings with employers, as sponsors of occupational pension 
schemes, and their consultants between January and April 2015. One example was a 
meeting with members of the CBI’s pensions panel on 25 February 2015 and another was 
with the Society of Pension Professionals on 6 January 2015. There were also many separate 
face-to-face meetings. We discussed a broad range of issues which we summarise under the 
following headings.  
What are the attitudes of employers in general to ‘freedom and choice’? 
A typical response from a consultant was this: ‘We know that employers are absolutely 
disenchanted with Government pension policy about “freedom and choice”. In particular, it 
does not help them with retirement management now that employees can take their pot as 
cash from age 55 and continue working for as long as they want/need to. So, for employers, 
the DC scheme is no longer a key feature of the reward structure – if they want to improve 
attraction/reward, they do this through a share scheme, for example’. 
Overwhelmingly, employers called for a period of stability in pensions policy. They noted 
that the 2014 Budget was completely unexpected, massive in impact, and the reforms were 
introduced without any consultation. Employers need stability from a business perspective – 
they are still dealing with a whole range of major issues, including auto-enrolment (AE), the 
ending of contracting out, DB funding issues, etc. Business systems take time to adapt in 
response to major changes. Employers believed it was essential that policy makers really 
made an effort to understand how the pensions market works in practice and how it works 
for different types of employers. Currently, this is not the case: ‘How can ministers and civil 
servants understand if they are remote from the real world and if they were auto-enrolled 
into a gold-plated, tax-payer-funded DB scheme when they started employment?’ In view of 
this, some employers were keen to explore the idea of a permanent pensions commission. 
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Do employers differ in their responses to ‘freedom and choice’? 
Employers are grouped along a spectrum. At one end are those employers and their 
advisers who want to encourage their scheme members to transfer out of the DB scheme in 
order to de-risk it. Some employers expected 50% of their members to transfer and are 
promoting/advertising transfer values (TV): 
 using all communications channels 
 actively targeting those above age 50 
 TV information in retirement packs 
 TV information in annual benefit statement. 
At the other end are large long-established employers running a single trust-based DC 
scheme which was set up when the DB scheme was closed down. Such employers: 
 are more paternalistic partly by nature or history and partly because they have a 
reputation to protect 
 feel the need to do something to protect employees from themselves; they want 
current and future employees to know that they look after their staff at the point of 
retirement and beyond 
 are not commercial – they are not trying to sell anything 
 are big, compared with new AE schemes – some go back more than 20 years. 
Other employers in this second group include the outsourcing industry, facilities 
management, former-public-sector companies, etc. They have a very high staff turnover 
rate for a lot of workers, but also a significant number of long-service employees – and they 
need to be able to retire them efficiently. 
Employers’ attitudes on value for money for scheme members 
One employer told us that having paid 16% p.a. into employees’ pension pots, he  wanted to 
ensure members secured value for money in drawdown. This type of employer is likely to 
ensure members get the right sort of help. This might not be just because they are altruistic, 
it is also because it makes good business sense, since efficient retirement solutions avoid 
the HR log-jam. 
When addressing the needs of the majority of auto-enrolled members, the employers that 
we interviewed recognised the importance of caution when assessing the pot size. The 
pensions industry (providers and advisers) tends to assume that £80,000 is a large sum, 
even though this buys a relative small annuity of only around £4,000 p.a. Employers were 
concerned that the industry would focus more on the fee/commission/profit that can be 
made than on the solutions it could provide. Many thought that retail drawdown products 
were expensive. 
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However, the OFT’s Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study cited earlier also 
pointed out that ‘many employers may not have the capability or the incentive to drive 
competition on the key elements of value for money in the interests of scheme 
members…Employers may also seek to prioritise the interests of scheme members that are 
current employees, over those scheme members that are former employees’. The last point 
is likely to be very important when it comes to retirement income in the new pensions 
environment: we were told on numerous occasions that many employers will just want to 
see the their retired employees off their books and will have little interest in how they 
spend their pension pot. 
Value for money for employers 
Employers also told us they are keen to secure value for money in return for company 
pension contributions. The benefit to the employer of running a scheme has changed 
significantly since the hey-day of final-salary schemes. The extent to which employers ‘care’ 
about employees’ pensions is closely linked to staff turnover and age. Many employers still 
use the pension scheme for traditional recruitment/retention purposes, e.g., they offer a 2-
for-1 match (so if the employee puts in 5%, the employer will put in 10%, giving a total 
contribution of 15%). Some employers still have low staff turnover (one employer told us 
this was just 2% in his company) and so being able to provide an adequate secure 
retirement income is a very important benefit and really valued by employees. Attitudes will 
be different in the case of a call centre with 200% annual staff turnover of mainly young 
employees. In such businesses, the cost of a pension scheme above the legal minimum is 
disproportionate to the benefit to the business.  
The 2014 Budget combined with the loss of the right to retire employees at a specific age (as 
a result of age discrimination legislation) means that, for employers, the pension scheme 
‘has fallen apart’ as the key tool in retirement management. So pensions are deferred pay, 
but key questions employers are asking are (a) to what age is pay deferred? and (b) how 
long does our commitment last after that? The Budget changes actually push some 
decisions out to an older age than ever before. If employers offer scheme drawdown, they 
need to know when to annuitise and this will be at a much older age than employers are 
used to dealing with. Employers will have a long-term risk on their books, especially in 
relation to the cognitive issues many of their older former employees will face – this is very 
worrying for employers. 
Employers are very keen to regain control of human resource management in their 
businesses. Even HR managers – generally the strongest supporters of a pension scheme in 
any business – are beginning to think that the cost of the scheme does not represent value 
for money for the business. Finance directors – traditionally amongst those in a business 
who are the least interested in the company pension scheme – have become very focused 
on this and are increasingly convinced that even a DC scheme is not a worthwhile business 
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cost – especially given the level of contribution needed to deliver an adequate pension and 
the risk that employees can no longer afford to retire.  
Furthermore, we were told that the following attitude was common amongst trustees: 
‘Trustees really, really don’t want a pensioner category added to the existing active and 
deferred member categories. In fact, they don’t even want deferred members and get rid of 
them whenever they can.’ The treatment of deferred members gives us an indication of 
what is likely to happen to retirees in some trust-based DC schemes. We understand that 
trustees usually have the right to force annuitisation by default. We were told that many 
trustees conduct an annual ‘sweep up’ exercise and transfer deferred members to contract-
based arrangements. Since this is likely to be the existing provider’s personal pension 
(rather than an aggregator contract-based DC scheme), it is quite possible that the annual 
charge would be higher (some trustees insist on no increase; others do not). We were told 
that many trustees will take this same approach to retired members, which means that 
unless the member has already taken action, he or she will be transferred into a contract-
based DC pension within the first year. We understand that trustees have the right to do 
this without seeking the member’s permission. 
The implication of this trend, if the ‘sweep up’ practice becomes extensive and if retirees 
are transferred from trust- to contract-based arrangements, is that the trust-based model 
for auto-enrolment could unravel. Employers – the buyers of schemes – will decide that it is 
much easier to use a contract-based scheme from the outset. 
So the future of private sector pension provision in the UK might well be very different from 
the past as a result of recent policy changes, and not just because of ‘freedom and choice’, 
but also because of the reductions in the annual allowance and the lifetime allowance and 
possible changes to the system of pension tax relief. These latter changes and potential 
changes significantly reduce the value of directors’ pension benefits – so why should 
directors be interested in pensions for their employees? In future, firms might provide just 
the minimum level of contributions to an AE scheme and offer some other employee 
benefits (e.g., SAYE), but also set up non-pension corporate trust or custody accounts for 
certain high valued employees. The aim would be to use a non-pension route to maintain 
corporate control over when employees can afford to retire. 
1.4 Providers and investment managers 
We participated in a number of meetings and events between January and March 2015 with 
providers – mainly insurance companies – and their representative body, the ABI. We also 
met a selection of investment managers and their representative body, the Investment 
Association. This section summarises the various views expressed by individuals 
representing these organisations under the following headings. 
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What are the attitudes of providers and investment managers in general to ‘freedom 
and choice’? 
The following points emerged from our discussions: 
 ‘The 2014 Budget changes were introduced without consultation with industry: 
“once the genie is out of the bottle, it’s very hard to put it back in”’ 
 ‘There has been no stability in pensions policy since the 1988 Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act introduced personal pensions to replace retirement annuity 
contracts and Section 226 policies from 1 July 1988’ 
 ‘The only policy success in recent years has been auto-enrolment. There has been no 
success in increasing engagement, or in financial education, or in getting people to 
understand the risks they face. Safeguards only work if people are engaged and 
understand these risks’ 
 ‘No further quick changes. We may need change, but it must be done slowly and 
carefully. Any further changes need to take account of existing policy changes’ 
 Insurers (including those with investment management arms) need to address the 
lack of consumer trust. An interviewee – from a provider – told us: ‘Currently, 
provider self-interest drives outcomes’ 
 ‘The various mis-selling scandals over the last 25 years are “open sores”. Insurers are 
trusted less than banks and estate agents’ 
 ‘Insurers need to reform to meet the entire set of needs in decumulation, which 
comprise not only insurance products, but also investment management. They need 
to adapt to survive’ 
 Insurers accept that it is the clients’ money and that the clients can do what they like 
with it –‘we don’t want to be in the press saying we wouldn’t give it to them’ 
 ‘A key issue which we cannot duck is the inadequacy of savings. The best 
decumulation market in the world cannot compensate for this’ 
 ‘Another key challenge is the younger generation which will rely entirely on DC. One 
in three babies born in 2015 will live beyond age 100’ 
 ‘Innovation is essential. In other sectors, providers offer automatic upgrades in terms 
of tariffs and products (e.g., mobile phone). There was no reason why the pension 
industry should not do the same. Existing customers should be offered the latest 
products and pricing. Old products should be decommissioned without penalties to 
existing customers’ 
 ‘Retirement will no longer be a point-in-time event’ 
 ‘”Freedom and choice” has not changed customers’ needs’. 
What is a ‘good’ pension scheme trying to achieve? 
A good pension scheme needs to deliver a minimum of three things: 
 Accessibility 
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 Inflation protection via investment performance 
 Longevity insurance. 
Good outcomes for a pension scheme will be: 
 A sustainable income 
 The flexibility to take into account personal circumstances 
 Customers do not want to be surprised by what could happen in 10 years’ time, i.e., 
running out of money. 
However: 
 ‘Good’ is not defined in policy or regulation 
 It is difficult to construct a definition because needs vary 
 We must also decide if ‘good’ means the individual gets what they need, rather than 
what they want. 
What are the biggest challenges to achieving these objectives? 
The biggest challenge is to stop people from self-harm in terms of tax, charges, investment 
risk, etc. The biggest risks relate to: 
 Tax: if people withdraw too much in a single tax year, they could put themselves into 
a higher tax bracket for that year 
 Charges: the impact of charges relative to returns 
 Market volatility risk: taking income after the market has fallen. One provider told 
us: ‘We manage volatility by balancing the source of withdrawals between capital 
growth and dividends – dividends are important because they still tend to be paid 
even if the market falls significantly’. 
 Composure risk: people need to avoid over-reacting to market volatility – the risk is 
that if the market ‘tanks’, people will sell at the bottom; this mainly affects non-
advised customers 
 Underspending: many people are scared of running out of money, so a big risk is that 
they under-draw and therefore do not enjoy the retirement they could afford; this is 
common behaviour in the US. 
Another challenge relates to the issue of multiple pension pots. People might have a 
different pension pot for every job. This fragmentation of DC pots makes it difficult to 
aggregate. This is compounded by the fact that back books are often sold and resold. One 
implication is that ‘pot size is a terrible proxy for wealth – people could have secure DB 
pensions and might need a bridging pension for a few years’. There was support for the 
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concept of a ‘pension dashboard’ which shows the state pension, any DB pension and up to 
three DC pension pots. This would need HMRC and state pension calculators to plug in.40 
1.5 Trade unions 
A panel of trade unionists and TUC officials (together with two consumer group participants) 
met with us on 12 January 2015 to address the following questions. 
What should be the primary aims of a ‘good’ DC scheme?  
The view of the panel members was that the primary aim of a good DC scheme should be to 
provide a lifelong index-linked income in retirement. This is because there is a ‘lack of 
longevity risk awareness’ and because there is ‘little merit in a predictable income that is 
declining in real terms’. One participant said: ‘People do not understand inflation or 
longevity very well. I think the answer is that we need to have good defaults so people are 
nudged into having some kind of inflation-linked income. Why is the only choice level or RPI-
linked annuities? Is there not a sense that people spend more in their early retirement? 
However, not everybody has a predictable U-shaped expenditure need; spending more in 
early retirement then becoming frailer. These are the sorts of things we might think about in 
a default strategy’. However, the same participant conceded that: ‘It is rational to take out a 
level annuity if you have a small pot. Most of your income is from the state pension. This 
suggests that there should be some inflation linking but not quite the expense of RPI’. 
Another participant said: ‘There is also the issue of who pays for social care. This is crucial 
for knowing what is an adequate pension. Could it be something like a 50% target 
replacement ratio? Similarly, who is paying the pension contributions? What is the 
employer’s role in that? Historically, employers have paid much more in contributions into 
DB schemes. Are we still expecting good DC schemes to replicate the proportion of income 
that DB does? It doesn’t do that. Good DC only comes about with adequate contributions’. 
How do you assess value for money? 
We next asked about value for money as a primary aim of a good scheme which led to the 
following discussion: 
 ‘It is difficult to define value for money. It is impossible when you do not know what 
the charges are. No-one knows the full extent of hidden charges’ 
 ‘For accumulation, NEST provides some sort of target or benchmark for other 
schemes regarding their charges. A NEST-like vehicle in decumulation might echo 
that by providing a standard others could match’ 
 ‘If you think how difficult shopping around for an annuity is, it’s going to be even 
more difficult in future under drawdown. There will be investment charges, 
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administration charges, platform charges, even before you get into the transaction 
costs. It is going to be very difficult for people to compare’ 
 ‘Given that we know retired people will not be rational consumers in a market place, 
how do we get institutional arrangements that have trust-based decumulation 
vehicles of sufficient size and scale to negotiate good value contracts? In the same 
way NEST has done well to secure low charges from fund managers because they 
know pots will get much bigger in future; and People’s and NOW probably have got 
charges down too.  We need a limited number of large trust-based schemes that can 
really push the investment managers down to the lowest possible charges’. 
What are the longer term consequences of ‘freedom and choice’? 
One participant said: ‘An unintended consequence might be that companies switch to 
contract-based schemes. I think it is unrealistic to expect an employer-sponsored trust-
based DC scheme to be to be looking after their pensioners too – as well as current workers. 
I wonder whether there should be a way for occupational trust-based single-employer 
schemes to pass on assets to a trust-based decumulation vehicle. It could be NEST. We need 
to learn the lesson of auto-enrolment which is that the market failed, particularly, low and 
middle income earners. You need to have a new public policy-based, trust-based 
decumulation vehicle. It would provide an option for schemes that do not want to carry on 
doing that. I am worried about what small contract-based providers can offer in terms of 
decumulation. I am also worried about the expense of advice. For small pots, guidance is 
probably sufficient. Members with large pots have more need for advice, but are also more 
capable of paying for that usually. I think there is a vested interest in the pensions industry 
for making everything as complicated as possible. For low and middle income earners, it 
should be a commodity product. Only a minority of employers will want to operate 
decumulation options for their workforce. It is easy to get wrong. The advantages to the 
employer are minimal’. 
Another participant agreed: ‘Employers might be keen to look after current contributors, 
but not so when they have left their employment. Few employers make good contributions 
to DC schemes. What does that tell you about their likely enthusiasm for providing 
decumulation products?’.  Yet another said: ‘If an employer is putting in extra into pensions, 
they will want it to go as a benefit to existing staff, not those who have left. There is no 
point providing benefits at that stage’. 
1.6 Wider issues 
The 2014 Budget changes will have wider macro-economic consequences beyond those that 
affect pension scheme members and sponsors. Of particular importance is what will happen 
to the UK bond market. The gilts market is the longest maturity bond market in the world as 
a result of the demand by pension schemes and insurance companies for long maturity 
bonds to match their pension and annuity payments. This has helped to drive down long-
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term bond yields, which have been driven down further by the Government’s quantitative 
easing programme. The corporate bond market has also benefited from this as insurers 
have switched to this sector in search of higher yields. However, annuity sales have fallen by 
60% in the year since the Budget41 and this has had a significant impact on the corporate 
bond market. According to Andreas Michalitsianos, manager of J.P. Morgan Asset 
Management's Sterling Corporate Bond Fund, issuance in the long-dated sterling corporate 
bond market has been driven to the point of extinction. He said: ‘What [the pension 
reforms] did was take away a natural buyer of long-dated investment grade corporates. The 
market for annuities was £11bn p.a., and two-thirds of that made its way into the sterling 
corporate bond market so, in context, that means a significant slowdown….The trend is 
likely to be here for the long term, as future demand for annuities is unlikely to return to 
previous levels’.42 The Government could also find it much harder to issue long-term bonds 
in the future due to reduced demand from annuity providers. 
However a report from CREATE-Research and Northern Trust was more optimistic about the 
future of annuities. Based on interviews with 15 insurance companies and investment 
managers, the report stated: ‘Over time annuities will make a comeback within a new 
hierarchy of products, with diversified income funds at the bottom and annuities at the top. 
In between, two new product sets will emerge: pathway funds that target retirement 
income in the accumulation phase (e.g., target date funds, diversified growth funds) and 
managed drawdown funds offering a steady income’.43 The Budget also had a significant 
impact on annuity pricing. According to Billy Burrows, the annuity expert: ‘The pension 
freedoms have played havoc with annuity pricing’, with average standard annuity rates at 
their lowest ever level in April 2015.44  
As a final point, we note that the ending of both private-sector defined-benefit pension 
provision in the UK and the requirement to annuitise private-sector DC pension pots will 
radically change the concentration of longevity risk in the UK. Until recently, this was shared 
between the state – via state pension provision – and the private sector – via company DB 
pensions and annuities sold by insurers. Under ‘freedom and choice’, individuals now bear 
their own idiosyncratic longevity risk. But if things go wrong and a significant proportion of 
these individuals outlive their pension pots, the burden for bailing them out will fall 
exclusively on the state – in other words, the next generation of tax payers. They might, in 
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turn, refuse to help out their reckless and profligate forebears, leading to intergenerational 
conflict.45 
1.7 Responses to the consultation paper 
We will summarise the responses to the first two questions in the consultation paper here. 
1. (a) What should be the primary aims of a ‘good’ DC scheme? Please explain.  (b) If the 
provision of a predictable income should be a primary aim of a ‘good’ DC scheme, how 
should this be defined? (c) If value for money should be a primary aim of a ‘good’ DC scheme, 
how should this be defined?  
Responses to this question were quite varied (and some respondents listed many desiderata 
while others noted just one). However, there was surprisingly little agreement amongst 
pension professionals about what the aims of a good DC pension scheme should be. With 
this important point in mind, three themes did stand out as being important. First, the level 
of pension savings should be adequate. Second, pension savers need choice and flexibility. 
Finally, pension savers need simplicity to help them engage with the process. 
2. (a) Do you agree with the breakdown of risks listed in the Introduction? (b) Are there any 
important risks we have not identified? 
Ninety-five per cent of respondents agreed or largely agreed with the breakdown of risks. 
Additional risks (or issues) were also mentioned: health and long-term care risk; risk via 
shocks to a partner or family; lack of engagement by savers; sequence-of-returns risks and 
shocks; delays in realising that mistakes had been made and consequent delays in taking 
remedial action; the risk that regulation might stifle competition and raise costs. 
1.8 Analysis 
Our discussions with representatives of employers, consultants, providers, investment 
managers and unions together with the feedback we received from the consultation have 
provided invaluable inputs into our analysis in this Report as well as the recommendations 
we make. In terms of this Chapter, they have helped us develop the criteria for a good DC 
pension scheme that we propose in Table 1.1 and complete the list of key risks involved in 
the generation of retirement income from pension savings in Table 1.2. The discussions 
have also provided an insight into the longer term consequences that might follow from the 
introduction of ‘freedom and choice’.  
One of the key reasons why enlightened employers established pension schemes in the 
nineteenth century was to manage the exit of their employees from the company when 
they were no longer capable of productive work, while ensuring that their former 
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employees did not live in poverty in old age. In those days, retirement was a single event, 
while today it is a process. This, in turn, has meant that age management has become an 
increasingly important aspect of human resource management, especially in large 
organisations. However, this becomes considerably more difficult following the 2014 
Budget.  If employees over the age of 55 spend their pension pot unwisely, they may not be 
able to retire as planned and may be forced to stay in post, often with little or no notice 
given to the company. Our interviews revealed that employers are not at all happy with this 
prospect.  Inevitably, it will lead to many of them questioning why they now need to have a 
pension scheme. They are, of course, required to provide their employees with access to a 
pension scheme at the AE minimum, but many will begin to wonder why they even need to 
do that, given that many of their employees do not appear to value pension benefits and 
that recent governments have massively reduced the incentives for company directors to 
accrue pension benefits for themselves.  
We might well look back at the 2014 Budget as the event that marked the end of private-
sector employer commitment to providing any pension provision above the legal required 
minimum. Naturally, we would regard that as little short of tragic. This is because: (a) we 
find it hard to see what alternative cost-effective age management tools are available to 
employers, (b) we find it hard to see what other vehicles will enable employees to save 
enough to provide a decent life-long standard of living after they retire, and (c) we believe it 
will put great pressure on governments to raise the value of the minimum safety net 
provided by the state pension or to increase the state pension age even more rapidly than is 
currently planned. Nevertheless, our Report is about the decumulation of existing pension 
assets and we devote the rest of this Report to this task.46  
Our interviews appear to show that employers are bifurcating into two groups. On the one 
hand, there are those employers who see ‘freedom and choice’ as a unique opportunity to 
reduce their DB pension deficits, by encouraging scheme members to transfer out into a DC 
scheme – when they do this, they take their share of the deficit with them. How often is an 
employer given the opportunity to cut their workers’ (deferred) pay47 by 15% or more and 
the workers believe they are better off as a result?  
On the other hand, there are paternalistic employers who want the best for their former 
employees, but who are terrified of being sued if things go wrong. An interesting message 
from our interviews is that ‘freedom and choice’ has increased risk aversion on the part of 
employers. Some employers would like to provide advice for their soon-to-be former 
employees, but are reluctant to do so in case it later backfires. Some employers are even 
considering scheme drawdown, e.g., by offering decumulation defaults that involve 
drawdown with automatic annuitisation triggers if the fund falls below a certain level to 
                                                     
46
 There is, however, a brief discussion of the adequacy of pension savings in the appendix to this Chapter. 
47
 Pensions are deferred pay under EU legislation. 
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protect against longevity risk. Yet, we are not aware of any employers that have actually 
gone ahead with this idea and it is clear that many employers would be uncomfortable with 
any sort of scheme defaults due to the associated long-term liability associated with poor 
outcomes. 
1.9 Recommendations 
Our analysis in this Chapter leads to the following two recommendations. 
Recommendation 1.1: Criteria for a good DC pension scheme 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to demonstrate to scheme 
trustee (or governance) committees and to regulators how their schemes provide good 
outcomes for members in terms of the following criteria: 
 Delivers adequate and sustainable pensions; by sustainable, we mean having 
support mechanisms in place that help people not to spend their pension fund too 
quickly after retirement 
 Produces stable and predictable lifelong retirement incomes, even if those incomes 
cannot be guaranteed (unless a lifetime annuity is purchased) 
 Offers the flexibility to purchase a lifetime annuity at any time (or at regular 
predetermined intervals) 
 Has the flexibility for members to withdraw funds to meet ‘lumpy’ expenses, such 
as the cost of a new boiler 
 Provides an investment strategy that reflects the scheme member’s attitude to and 
capacity to take risk, and generates a return at least as high as inflation 
 Provides value for money for every pound saved in the scheme 
 Has transparent charges and costs 
 Provides reliable and efficient administration 
 Delivers effective communications to members 
 Protects scheme assets from fraud or theft 
 Has minimum quality standards in terms of operational efficiency, charges and 
governance with a duty by the governance committee to act in members’ best 
interests. 
As part of this recommendation, each qualitative term (such as adequate, sustainable, 
stable, predictable, suitable, reliable, effective and efficient) needs to be given a 
quantitative measure that would gain wide acceptance by the industry, regulators and 
policy makers, along the lines of what is specified in, say, a service level agreement. 
It is important to note that the recommendation implicitly assumes that the pension 
scheme provides both the accumulation and decumulation stages. If, as it is becoming 
increasingly likely, the accumulation and decumulation stages are separated and different 
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providers service the different stages, then the above list of criteria would have to modified 
to reflect this. 
Recommendation 1.2: Explaining key risks involved in the generation of retirement 
income from pension savings 
We recommend that scheme providers should be required to explain to scheme trustee 
(or governance) committees (and where possible to members) the following key risks in 
retirement income provision and how their scheme deals with these risks: 
 Contribution risk  – The risk that pension contributions (and hence pension savings) 
are lower than planned, e.g., because the scheme member becomes unemployed, 
is unable to work due to ill health, or is unable to pay off their debts 
 Retirement timing risk – Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire 
and/or begin to make withdrawals 
 Product choice risk – Uncertainty about how the scheme member will make 
withdrawals, not least because of the very large set of choices now available  
 Investment risk – The risk that investment performance is worse than expected or 
the risk that investments do not generate incomes in a way that matches the 
desired pattern of consumption in retirement. A particularly important example of 
investment risk is sequence-of-returns risk 
 Inflation risk – The risk that inflation is higher than anticipated 
 Interest rate risk – The risk that interest rates are low at the point of annuity 
purchase 
 Longevity risk – The risk that individual savers live longer than their life expectancy 
(i.e., idiosyncratic longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a whole live longer 
than anticipated (i.e., systematic or aggregate longevity risk) 
 Cost risk – The risk that the total costs of running the pension scheme during 
accumulation and decumulation are higher than expected or understood 
 Political risk – The risk that the Government changes the rules in an adverse way 
(e.g., reduces the level of tax relief) 
 Regulatory risk – The risk that regulations change in an adverse way (e.g., the 
regulator increases regulatory capital requirements, which has the effect of 
reducing annuity rates) 
 Demographic/cultural risk – The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are unable to 
honour the implicit intergenerational contract that underlies many pension 
schemes. For example, the next generation of workers refuses – or is unable – to 
pay the pensions the retired generation expects to receive, because they are 
unwilling to honour the implicit contract or because there are too few of them in 
relation to the size of the retired population. Also, an arrangement that works in 
one culture (e.g., Holland) might not work in another (e.g., the UK) 
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 Market conduct risk – The risk that those who provide services to the scheme act in 
a way that disadvantages scheme members (e.g., investment managers subject to 
a charge cap negate the effects of the charge cap by increasing portfolio turnover, 
or the benefits of economies of scale go to scheme providers’ shareholders rather 
than to members); fraud and the activities of scammers would be included here 
 Behavioural risk – The risk that scheme members behave in a way that is not 
considered to be rational (i.e., is not in their long-term interests, since they make 
short-term decisions that they subsequently regret and are unable to learn from 
past mistakes). Inertia and lack of engagement would be included here, as would 
be the risk that members fail to understand the risks they face 
 Financial knowledge and understanding risk – The risk that a member’s financial 
knowledge and understanding are insufficient for the member ever to make an 
‘informed’ choice 
 Mental impairment risk – The risk that a scheme member’s mental faculties are 
reduced due to the onset of dementia, for example.  
1.10 The remainder of the Report 
Chapters 2-6 will address the following issues and make recommendations: 
 How to ensure that the workplace pension retirement products available to people 
are those best suited to ensure they have security and confidence in retirement 
 The support savers need to make the right choice at retirement for them and their 
family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
 How savers can be helped to manage longevity risk 
 The role of the National Employment Savings Trust in helping savers to access good 
quality retirement products 
 The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced in the UK. 
Chapter 7 will conclude the Report and present our overarching recommendations. 
Appendix: Studies on the adequacy of pension savings 
Most studies going back over a number of years show that the level of pension savings in 
the UK is not adequate to produce a reasonable standard of living in retirement: 
 Aegon and the Association of Independent Financial Advisers (2010) Saving Britain: A 
White Paper on Rebuilding Britain’s Savings Culture 
 Aviva (2010)  Mind The Gap: Quantifying The Pensions Gap In The UK 
 Aviva (2011) Big Picture Thinking – Towards Sustainable Savings 
 Aviva (2012) Tackling the Savings Gap: Engagement and Empowerment 
 Chartered Insurance Institute (2011) An Age-old Problem: Developing Solutions for 
Funding Retirement 
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 Chatham House (2011) Squeezed in Retirement: The Future of Middle Britain 
 Strategic Society Centre (2011) Who Saves for Retirement?  
More recently, in March 2015, the Savings and Investments Policy Project (TSIP), managed 
by the Tax Incentivised Savings Association (TISA), published a report, Our Financial Future, 
found that: 
 The average pension pot size at retirement is £28,000, but at least £230,000 is 
needed for the average household to retire on two thirds of pre-retirement income 
 Two thirds of adults recognise they are not saving enough, one fifth do not save 
anything 
 More than half of people would like to save more but cannot afford to 
 One third of the population has less than £250 in savings 
 Fewer than half (45%) of people of working age are saving for retirement. 
The report found that inadequate financial education and a lack of trust in financial services 
had created a savings gap, which will lead to ‘crisis point' in 2035 when the ‘auto-enrolment 
generation’ begins to retire. TSIP wants to establish a forum, comprising industry, 
Government and the Financial Conduct Authority, to agree on a common approach to 
financial education. It wants to simplify pension taxation so that the benefits of pension 
saving are made clearer and it wants to see the abolition of the lifetime allowance which 
acts as a disincentive to save. It also wants pension contributions to increase slowly to 
around 15%. 
In September 2015, the Office for National Statistics published the results of its 
Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2014. Active membership of occupational DC pension 
schemes has increased by two million since 2013 to 3.2 million, as a result of auto-
enrolment, but average contributions have halved from 9.1% of earnings to 4.7%, because 
most of these members will have been auto-enrolled on the minimum contribution rate.48 
In December 2015, the ONS revealed that 69% of employees in occupational DC schemes 
had employer contributions of less than 4%.49 
A study by PwC, also published in September 2015, reported the results of a survey of 1,200 
working adults. It found that 60% have put off saving more into their pension scheme 
because they are so confused about the current pensions system, with women and younger 
workers particularly unlikely to put money aside. The survey respondents are only saving an 
average of 5% of their salary towards their retirement, independent of age. Only 5% are 
saving more than 10% of their salary and this is mostly those earning over £100,000 a year. 
                                                     
48 Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) ONS: DC membership jumps by 2m but contributions halved, Professional 
Pensions, 24 September. Active membership of private sector defined benefit schemes is only 0.6 million. 
49 Office for National Statistics (2015) Active Members of Occupational Pensions-Employer Contribution Rates,  
December.  
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Average employer contributions are 6%. Philip Smith, head of defined contribution pensions 
at PwC, said: ‘Efforts need to focus on improving saver awareness, increasing auto-
enrolment contribution levels and improving financial education, so people can plan for the 
retirement they hope for’.50 
Another study published in September 2015 was commissioned by Royal London  and 
conducted by the Centre for Economics and Business Research. This again found that 
millions of young people are not saving enough for their retirement, yet will face much 
higher expenses when they retire than the current generation of pensioners. The study 
estimates that 8.3 million people aged between 30 and 40 are not saving for a pension, but 
will have to spend 148 per cent more than today’s pensioners to maintain living standards 
by 2050, with the minimum income needed of £33,000 per annum. The implication is that 
the average 35-year-old who is halfway to retirement in 2050 with a pension pot of just 
£14,000 will need a fund of at least £666,000 – not including any state pension. Today, a 
typical pensioner spends £1,084 a month on housing, food, heating and transport.  With 
inflation, this will rise to £1,715 a month by 2050.51 
In October 2015, the Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) published the results of a  
survey of contributions to auto-enrolment schemes. A total of 477 employers  sponsoring 
over 620 pension schemes responded to the survey. Of these, 46% had reached their 
staging date for auto-enrolling employees into a qualifying scheme, while many of the rest 
had not reached their staging date and did not have an existing pension scheme. When 
scaled up to the level of the economy, the survey suggests that millions of workers having 
been enrolled into pension schemes since 2012 at the minimum level of combined employer 
and employee contributions of barely 2% of total earnings. This has had a dramatic effect in 
reducing the average contribution rate into DC schemes over the last couple of years as 
Table 1.3 reveals. The table shows the 2% combined minimum contribution rate into NEST, 
but it also shows that the combined contribution rate into trust-based DC schemes has 
fallen from 11.4% to 9% since 2013. This contrasts with contributions of up to 26% in DB 
schemes.   
 
 
 
                                                     
50
 Reported in Lauren Fedor (2015) Pension confusion is leaving British workers unprepared for retirement – 
PwC, City A.M., 30 September. 
51 Reported in Sarah O'Grady (2015) Poverty warning to millions in their 30s who scorn pensions, Daily Express, 
29 September. Another problem is that fewer young people will be able to afford to buy their own homes in 
future which means that they will not be able to subsequently sell their homes to pay for long-term care. This 
will have a knock-on effect on future welfare payments.  
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Table 1.3: Median contribution rates into pension arrangements provided by responding 
employers  
 Employer Employee 
Group personal pension 4% 
(5.8%) 
3% 
(4.2%) 
Trust-based DC 5% 
(6.9%) 
4% 
(4.5%) 
NEST 1% 
(NA) 
1% 
(NA) 
Other multi-employer 
schemes 
3% 
(NA) 
1% 
(NA) 
Mixed DB/DC 11-15% 
(NA) 
5% 
(NA) 
Defined benefit 16-20% 
(21.9%) 
6% 
(6.1%) 
Note: Figures in brackets are 2013 mean figures from ACA (2013) Pension Trends Survey Report 
Source: Figure 3 in ACA (2015) Pension Trends Survey, First Report, Table 8, page 21, and ACA (2015) Pension 
Trends Survey, Second Report, page 25 
 
In October 2015, Equiniti published the results of a survey of 1,200 employees which 
showed that 27% of them were unable to save on a regular basis, despite being keen to do 
so. Only about a third were saving on a regular basis with savings of at least 5% of earnings. 
Most of the rest had made no financial provision for their future or were focused on paying 
off their mortgage and clearing other debts. Equiniti concluded that there is a ‘long term 
savings gap which threatens to become a financial time bomb’.52 
In November 2015, Scottish Widows and the Fawcett Society released a report called 
Women in Retirement which showed that only half of British women are saving enough for 
their retirement, while nearly a quarter are saving nothing at all. By contrast, 60% of men 
save adequately for retirement, and 15% do not save at all. Jackie Leiper of Scottish Widows 
said: ‘When it comes to attitudes towards retirement saving, young men and women appear 
to be almost on a par, yet our research has identified an alarming divergence in the 30s 
which needs to be addressed. Whether it’s having a family, taking a career break or 
                                                     
52 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Quarter of workers willing but unable to save – research, Professional 
Adviser, 20 October. 
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changing working patterns, we need to ensure that these life changes impacting women do 
not jeopardise their future security’.53  
A Scottish Widows Retirement Report published in June 2015 paints a slightly more 
optimistic picture of the nation’s retirement savings, based on a survey of 5,000 people. 
Whilst acknowledging that 6.2 million people (or 20% of the population) are still saving 
nothing for retirement and a further 19% have no savings or investments whatsoever, the 
report finds that 56% of the population are now making ‘adequate’ pension contributions 
which the insurer defines as 12% of earnings. This is more than twice the 2006 contribution 
level (6%) and a third higher than the 9% level reached in 2013.54 A survey published by 
National Savings & Investments in July 2015 showed that monthly per capita savings have 
increased by 50% over the past decade from £68.85 in 2005 to £104.56 in 2015. However, 
this would not be adequate to provide a decent standard of living in retirement.55 
Despite these encouraging glimmers, we believe, on balance, that the following assessment 
is more realistic: ‘The DWP has warned that 11.9m UK adults are failing to save enough for 
an “adequate income” in later years. No wonder the Chartered Insurance Institute 
estimated the total savings gap – just to deliver pensions at a level most people expect for a 
tolerable lifestyle – at around £9 trillion’.56 This means that there will be a ‘crisis point’ and 
it will happen much sooner than people possibly imagine. Robert Gardner, chief executive of 
investment consultant Redington, speaking at the 2015 NAPF annual conference, predicts 
that widespread social and economic unrest will be created by the UK’s ageing population. 
Currently, one in six pensioners (1.8 million people) live in poverty. He expects this to 
increase to five in six pensioners over the coming decades.57 
The 2015 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index places the UK pension system at the 
bottom of category B for good pension systems with a score of 65 out of 100, putting it in 
ninth position behind countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia. A key 
reason for this is low contribution rates. Glyn Bradley, senior associate at Mercer, said: 
‘Despite the introduction of auto-enrolment and record numbers of people in the UK 
enrolled in pension schemes, the UK is unlikely to make the A grade soon. “Having a 
pension” is not the same as having an adequate pension. The UK lacks the savings culture of 
other countries and current minimum auto-enrolment contributions are unlikely to deliver 
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 Reported in Rebecca Shahoud (2015), Only half of UK women saving enough for retirement, Professional 
Pensions, 18 November. 
54 http://www.scottishwidows.co.uk/extranet/working/about/reports/pension-report 
55 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) National savings up by half – is the message finally getting through?, 
Professional Adviser, 14 July.  
56 Quoted from KPMG (2015) 11.9 million failing to save enough for an adequate retirement income, 
advertorial in Financial News, 21-27 September. 
57 Reported in Andrew Pearce (2015) UK is heading towards a ‘pension crisis’, Financial News, 15 October 
2015.  
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adequate retirement outcomes. [The UK is] also an aging society, with relatively high debt, 
and [its] public sector and state pensions are almost entirely unfunded. [Its] pensions 
system has a high degree of integrity by international standards, but its low scores on 
adequacy and sustainability are putting [it] in danger of being relegated to the ‘C' league’.58 
In September 2015, BlackRock launched a retirement income tool, called CoRI, to allow 
consumers to determine how much they need to save to avoid running out of money in 
retirement. CoRI tells people of a given age what the cost of receiving a 'pound for life' from 
the age of 65. For example, on 22 September 2015, a 60-year-old (who will be 65 in 2020) 
would have to save £23.15 for every pound they want in their retirement. Users can then 
take the figure of their total savings and divide it by the value the index has produced to 
arrive at their annual retirement income for life. Someone with a pension pot of £250,000 at 
age 65 would receive a lifetime income of £10,799 (i.e., £250,000/23.15). The aim of CoRI is 
to inform people how much they need to save during their working lives to achieve a 
desired standard of living in retirement. Suppose someone wanted to have a pension of 
£5,000 p.a. in retirement. They would need a pension pot of £115,750 (£5,000 x 23.15). 
With an interest rate of 5% p.a., they would need to save £958 each year for 40 years. Chip 
Castille, chief retirement strategist at Blackrock said: ‘We have a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to change people's attitudes – they need to understand with certainty whether 
their savings will provide a sufficient income to support their desired lifestyle in 
retirement’.59  
The alternative to saving for retirement is to delay retirement, possibly indefinitely. This is 
the fate awaiting one in 10 Britons who are preparing to work until they drop, according to 
research by Baring Asset Management published in November 2015. One in three admitted 
they have no formal pension savings at all.60 A report entitled The Death of Retirement, 
released by Royal London in February 2016, found that someone contributing 8% of 
earnings from age 22 would need to work until 85 if they want to enjoy the ‘gold standard’ 
of 67% of pre-retirement income which is then indexed to inflation and also provides a 
partner’s pension. If they were content to live on the ‘silver standard’ of 50% of pre-
retirement income they would have to work until 80.61 
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 Reported in Jack Jones (2015) Freedom and choice blamed for weakening UK savings system, Professional 
Pensions, 20 October. 
59
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) BlackRock launches 'future value of a pound' retirement tool, 
Professional Adviser, 22 September. 
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 Reported in Harvey Jones (2015) Millions of Britons are facing up to a retirement pot shortfall, Daily Express, 
24 November. 
61 Reported in Rebecca Shahoud (2016) Royal London: Decent retirement might mean working until age 85, 
Professional Pensions, 15 February. 
 
